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Moldova’s European Choice:
‘Between Two Stools’?
ELENA KOROSTELEVA
Abstract
The article examines EU–Moldovan relations from the perspective of the external governance
framework. It reveals some considerable progress in the procedural engagement of both parties.
However, the internal instability experienced by Moldova in 2009 is seen to have disrupted these
relations, stalling further negotiations and even questioning Moldova’s true commitment to Europe.
To understand this ostensibly sudden change in Moldova’s allegiance to Europe, it is argued that
analysis needs to go beyond conventional governance framework(s). Premised on the notion of
‘constitutive boundaries’ a ‘partnership’ perspective offers a more nuanced understanding of the
boundaries of ‘the other’, thus revealing the salience of geopolitics and culture in Moldova’s relations
with the outside world.
MOLDOVA, A SMALL LAND-LOCKED COUNTRY, A MERE 0.2% the size of Russia,
gained its independence in 1991 for the first time in its long history.1 The dissolution of
the USSR left the country in absolute disarray: with steadily declining birth and
fertility rates,2 Moldova was rapidly becoming unsustainable as a nation.3 Torn
between a vociferous Russian-speaking minority and resolute Moldovan–Romanian
majority, many of whom were emigrating, Moldova looked unsettled and deserted.
Around one third of its workforce was residing (often illegally) in other countries
(Pantiru et al. 2007). The situation was further exacerbated by government
I wish to record my gratitude to the ESRC (RES-061–25–0001) for the financial support of my
project, and to thank Giles Polglase, Tanya Radchuk, Terry Cox, Sarah Lennon and the anonymous
referees for their helpful comments on an earlier version of my article.
1For a detailed overview of Moldova’s history see Teague (2004, pp. 13–24).
2For more information see http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/moldova_statistics.html; http://
globalis.gvu.unu.edu/indicator_detail.cfm?Country¼MD&IndicatorID¼132; and http://www.statistica.
md/pageview.php?l¼en&idc¼334&id¼2339, all accessed 15 July 2009.
3In 2009 Moldova reported 3.6 million residing on its territory (excluding the Transdniestrian
Moldovan Republic, which suggests a decline of 800,000 people since 1990). For more information see
Moldova in Figures 2009: Statistical Pocket-book, available at: http://www.statistica.md/public/files/
publicatii_electronice/Moldova_in_cifre/Breviar_en_fr_2009.pdf, accessed 15 July 2009.
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corruption4 and a poorly managed economy, which remained in recession for much of
the first decade of its independence: ‘Even Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, three
Caucasian countries that face[d] war and ethnic conflict, have left Moldova behind’
(Spanu 2004, p. 104). By early 2000 nearly 80% of the nation was living below the
poverty line, with one fifth of Moldovan children experiencing absolute poverty
(Pantiru et al. 2007). At the same time remittances from Moldovans working abroad
became a sizeable part of the economy for around two-thirds of the country’s
households, accounting for 40% of the total GDP.5
In 1992 a separatist war erupted claiming some 1,000 lives and reducing Moldova
to effectively ‘two republics in one’ (Hanne 2004, p. 81): the official Republic of
Moldova and a self-proclaimed Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic (TMR) viewed
by Russia as ‘a zone of special strategic interest’ (Lo¨wenhardt et al. 2001, p. 614).6
Some 2,600 troops from the Russian 14th Army were initially stationed there,
supported by between 5,000 and 6,000 TMR soldiers, with a substantial stockpile
of Soviet weaponry; their combined total almost equalled the size of Moldova’s
army. As Lo¨wenhardt et al. comment, the TMR ‘unrecognised by all but its own
rulers and the Russians’ became ‘a hotbed of organised crime, illegal arms dealings
and the smuggling of narcotics and human beings’ (Lo¨wenhardt et al. 2001, p. 615).
The separatist war left Moldova with a frozen conflict on its territory and also
deprived it of major resources, as the TMR controlled 90% of Moldova’s energy
and one third of its industrial output in the early 1990s (Lo¨wenhardt et al. 2001,
p. 614).
Moldova was evidently struggling to survive unaided. The demise of the USSR left
Moldova heavily dependent on Russia: 80% of Moldova’s exports were to the latter.
By 1997 Moldova had accrued an energy debt of around 11% of its total GDP. The
Transdniestrian conflict and the 1998 Russian economic crisis drove Moldova to the
brink of national bankruptcy, reducing its already low GDP to 34% of the 1989 level,
its industrial and agricultural outputs by nearly a quarter, and its exports by half
(Pantiru et al. 2007, pp. 4–5).
Logic would suggest that Moldova, being hitherto well integrated into the USSR,
would seek closer cooperation with the CIS and with Russia especially, as Belarus did
in the early 1990s. Instead, however, in 1994 Moldova chose to place itself on the path
of European integration by launching negotiations, on its own accord, with the
European Union (EU) for a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). By 1999
European integration was officially declared to be Moldova’s main foreign policy
priority, subsequently developing into The Concept of European Integration of the
4Moldova was at the bottom (ranked 75) of Transparency International’s 1999 Corruption
Perception Index, which has not significantly altered since. For more information see http://
www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/previous_cpi/1999, accessed 15 July 2009.
5Remittances in the Republic of Moldova: Patterns, Trends and Effects (Chisinau, International
Organisation for Migration), available at: http://www.un.md/key_doc_pub/IOM/Remittances_
eng.pdf, pp.3–4, accessed 15 July 2009.
6Unless otherwise stated the term Moldova will be used to describe the Republic of Moldova.
The Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic will be referenced separately or simply as TMR as
appropriate.
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Republic of Moldova,7 thus reflecting its aspirations for eventual membership of the
EU. By 2001 Moldova had become a member of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern
Europe and in 2005 successfully negotiated an Action Plan (AP) under the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), culminating in 2008 with a series of institutional, legal
and political reforms. The EU became Moldova’s major trade partner and accounted
for 50.2% of Moldova’s trade.8
Given the remarkable progress Moldova has made in less than a decade, it may
seem that Moldovan–EU relations are now irreversibly set to guide the country’s path
to European integration. However, 2009 was a critical year for Moldova’s government
and people. The year had begun with President Voronin’s unprecedented criticism of
the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in the Russian media and his sudden, trilateral
negotiations with Russia and TMR over a settlement of the conflict on the eve of the
elections. Thereafter there was an outbreak of civil unrest during the April 2009
parliamentary elections, resulting in a bloody aftermath. Since the outcome of the
elections was inconclusive as far as the selection of a new president was concerned a
second set of parliamentary elections took place in July. However, these elections were
also inconclusive and parliament remained incapable of electing a Head of State.9 In
relation to the EU the government also failed to complete the AP even after the
deadline was extended until July 2009. These unexpected events, as well as continued
stalemate in party politics, left Moldova’s prospects for European integration more
distant than ever—even after over 10 years of reform and gradual upgrading towards a
modern European state.
What has caused this abrupt turn in Moldova’s policy? What are the obstacles to
Moldova’s smooth cooperation with the EU? Why, after dedicating so much effort
and commitment in the last 10 years to European reforms, has Moldova’s transition
faltered and become more cautious towards the EU’s new initiatives? Was there ever
really a commitment to Europe? Conventional wisdom suggests that perhaps
one explanation may lie in the EU’s enlargement fatigue and its silent denial of the
European aspirations of its Eastern neighbours like Ukraine and Moldova. On the
other hand, it may also be that the problem lies with Moldova, which in the language
of EU diplomats, ‘adopts good laws, but has a poor enforcement record’ (Buscaneanu
2008a, p. 4). However, are these explanations adequate to explain the sudden halt in
progress in Moldova’s adjustment to the EU?
A more nuanced investigation highlights the inevitable interplay of geopolitics,
which clearly intensified following the adoption of the EaP (Council of the European
Union 2009). Furthermore, Moldova may have entrapped itself with its over-reliance
on third-party aid, its national sense of inferiority, and the power politics that was
7Available at: http://www.pasos.org/www-pasosmembers-org/publications/the-european-strategy-of-
the-republic-of-moldova, accessed 15 July 2009; and some brief information on http://www.moldova.md/
en/europa/, accessed 15 July 2009.
8Moldova remains the only country in the Eastern neighbourhood with such a high level of trade
engagement with the EU, closely followed by Ukraine (39.2%) and Georgia (31.1%). For more
information see: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/data.htm, accessed 15 July 2009.
9Mihai Ghimpu, the speaker of parliament, assumed the post of Acting President of Moldova, on
the resignation of President Voronin on 11 September 2009, until a new president could be elected by
parliament.
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vainly played by the Party of Communists (Partidul Comunis¸tilor din Republica
Moldova, PCMR). These factors and others will be examined below. The article will
begin with a discussion of a theoretical framework for analysing the EU’s engagement
with Moldova. The following section will then proceed by evaluating Moldova’s
journey to the EU in the light of the proposed theoretical framework. The next section
will focus more substantively on Moldova’s geopolitics.10 In the final section, the
prevailing culture and public opinion—captured through a nationwide survey, focus
groups, elite interviews and school essays11—will be examined to understand why EU–
Moldovan relations stalled. In conclusion, a more pessimistic outlook will be
considered—by placing Moldova in the vicious circle of elite self-interests, both at
home and abroad.
Governance or partnership in EU–Moldova relations?
Since the launch of the ENP there has been a general tendency to conceptualise the
EU’s relations with its neighbours through an external governance perspective which
offers a comprehensive basis for analysing various modes of exchange and interaction
between the EU and its partner states (Lavenex 2004, 2008; Raik 2006; Ga¨nzle 2008,
2009; Tulmets 2006, 2007; Weber et al. 2007). Although multiple and varied,12
governance approaches focus on ways of translating the new philosophy of
partnership embedded in the ENP into the realities of the European neighbourhood
(Commission of European Communities 2004, p. 8). The new philosophy of the ENP
was clearly designed to overcome the initially asymmetrical and unilateral character of
the EU’s relations with third states previously exposed by enlargement (Tulmets 2007).
10For a more comprehensive discussion of the geopolitical factor in the ENP, see Korosteleva (2009),
Popescu and Wilson (2009) and Averre (2009).
11This research is part of the wider project ‘Europeanising or Securitising the Outsiders? Assessing
the EU’s Partnership-building Approach with Eastern Europe’, under the ESRC grant (RES-061–25–
0001). For more information on the project see: http://www.aber.ac.uk/interpol/en/research/
EKPproject/index.htm. In Moldova, Independent Sociological Service ‘Opinia’ (ISS) was sub-
contracted to undertake project research, which included survey, interviews, focus groups and a study
of school essays. A nationwide survey was conducted in November 2008, involving 1,000 respondents
in a multi-staged, stratified random sample. Eighteen interviews were conducted in two phases: (i) in
February 2009 interviews undertaken by ISS involved government officials, MPs, representatives of
political parties, the mass media and think-tank organisations (February 2009, conducted by ISS); and
(ii) in October 2009 interviews undertaken by the author comprised of officials of the EU Delegation in
Moldova, selected EU embassies and senior government and parliament officials in Chisinau.
Interviews were semi-structured, in-depth, audio-recorded when permitted, anonymised when
requested, and lasted on average for 40–50 minutes. Interviews were conducted in English or the
local language. Five focus groups were conducted in Chisinau, Beltsi, Kahul and in small towns of the
Central regions in May–June 2009 (conducted by ISS) and comprised of students, representatives of
NGOs, academia, parties, government and the mass media. On average they had eight participants,
lasted up to two hours, and were audio- and video-recorded, using local languages for interlocution. A
study of 50 school essays of the final-year pupils from three randomly selected schools in Chisinau was
conducted in March–April 2009. In the study, school leavers were requested, without prior warning, to
write a maximum of a two-page essay on pre-set questions. The survey lasted on average 30–45
minutes. Essays were anonymised and computerised. For technical reports on fieldwork and brief
analytical findings please see the above website.
12For a comprehensive analysis of various schools and modes of governance see Treib et al. (2007).
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However, the notion of ‘partnership’ was not envisioned as replacing the EU’s existing
stress on ‘governance’ premised on ‘coercive conditionality’ that has typified its
relations with prospective member and partner countries, but instead to complement it
by utilising ‘more voluntary measures like new policy ideas, . . . mutual agreements or
joint ownership, . . . participation and deconcentration/decentralisation’ (Tulmets
2007, p. 212). As a result, when translated into practice, the new ‘partnership’
framework, initially conceptualised as voluntary, flexible and non-binding, ceases to
operate and becomes another instance of ‘external governance’ after all:
governance needs not be ‘new’ . . . Instead EU external relations may exhibit many features of
‘old governance’, including the highly asymmetrical relationship between insiders and
outsiders; the imposition of predetermined formal rules; the exclusive participation of
bureaucratic actors; and top-down communication structures. (Lavenex 2004, p. 682)
According to Lavenex (2008, p. 939), the new governance approach can be seen to
follow two major modes of exchange between the EU and its neighbours: a legal or
regulatory mode concerning the transfer of EU rules, procedures and practices (parts
of the EU acquis), and an institutional or organisational mode envisaging tapping into
the EU policy structures and joint decision-making at lower political levels by way of
‘horizontal network governance’. Others, such as Ga¨nzle (2008, 2009), define external
governance by its modus operandi—that is, through rules, actors and procedures
related to specific modes of communication, thus giving rise to four suitable modes of
governance: hierarchy, negotiation, competition and cooperation.
Such external governance frameworks are undoubtedly useful for evaluating the
EU’s actions in specific fields of its relations with outsiders. However, they are not
without shortcomings, of which two are particularly worth noting here: first, the
governance framework does not afford a satisfactory means of understanding how
notions of partnership are translated into practice and what limits there are to the
potential reach and appeal of the ENP and EaP in the neighbourhood; and secondly,
since it focuses mainly on procedural questions, the framework can detect gaps and
limitations, but it struggles to interpret their causes and consequences, especially if
they exceed the procedural modes of exchange. For example, the external governance
approach has failed to identify reasons for the varied (and often negative) response of
neighbours to the ENP.
It is therefore proposed to adapt the external governance framework by adding the
notion of ‘boundaries of order’ developed by Smith. This views the EU’s relations with
its ‘near abroad’ as the politics of inclusion, based on the negotiated order of
boundaries, ‘in which not only the outcomes but also the process itself of the EU
boundary setting is a matter of negotiation’, and which essentially is premised on
learning about the perceived boundaries of others, and ‘crossing rather than defending
the boundaries’ (Smith 1996, p. 23). According to Smith, different types of
boundaries—geopolitical, institutional or legal, transactional and cultural—‘exist or
can be constructed between the Union and its environment’. However, whereas Smith
contends that ‘the key variable . . . is the ability of the Union to draw, to maintain or
to modify a boundary between itself and the changing European order’ and that the
‘EU can structure and control linkages between insiders and outsiders’ (Smith 1996,
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pp. 12–13), it is argued here that the existence and the construction of boundaries is
essentially a two-way and ‘mutually constitutive’ process, whereby the EU is not only
an actor, but also a subject to boundary construction itself, in this case undertaken by
its neighbours.13
This enhanced framework of governance, which may be described as an ‘extended
partnership’ approach,14 allows the conceptualisation of EU–neighbour relations to
become far more comprehensive. It offers an understanding of both causes and
consequences of the procedural modes of governance, and it includes a sense of
partnership or participation by accounting for interests and boundaries of others. This
perspective will be applied to the analysis of the Moldova–EU relations in order to
evaluate the outcomes of governance and to understand how real partnership can be
enabled.
Moldova’s journey to EU: committed non-commitment?
First, in order to appreciate the progress Moldova has made, and the difficulties it has
encountered on the path of European integration, a brief overview of the development
of Moldovan–EU relations is offered. Then, drawing on Smith’s conceptualisation of
the boundaries involved in international governance relations, the specific boundaries
of Moldovan–EU relations, institutional/regulatory, transactional and conflict
management, will be discussed.
A brief history of Moldova–EU relations
Moldova and the EU signed their first contractual agreement (PCA) in 1994, thus
providing a framework for the development of political dialogue, trade and investment
and setting the basis for cooperation between the EU and Moldova. To achieve this,
however, it took President Mircea Snegur several attempts to bring Moldova to the
attention of the EU, and this was followed by a period of procrastination before the
PCA was ratified during the presidency of Petru Lucinschi, Moldova’s second
President (Chiril 2001). With an intended 10-year timeframe, the PCA finally came
into force in July 1998, institutionalising three main bodies to oversee its
implementation: the Cooperation Committee (comprising senior civil servants), the
Cooperation Council (comprising ministers and Commissioners) and the Parliamen-
tary Cooperation Committee (comprising members of the Moldovan and European
parliaments). The execution of the PCA for Moldova was challenging but with
progressive effort there were some clear accomplishments, especially relating to the
processes of Moldova’s legislative adaptation to the EU acquis and the facilitation of
its access to the European market. However, there have also been some sizable
inconsistencies and outright failures, for which Moldova blamed the absence of
benchmarks in the PCA, its late enforcement and limited motivation for reform
(Buscaneanu 2006).
13For more discussion of ‘boundary politics’ see Bosse and Korosteleva (2009) and Korosteleva
(2009).
14For more conceptual discussion see Korosteleva (forthcoming).
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Similarities drawn between the PCA and European Agreements signed with
candidate countries in East-Central Europe15 significantly inflated the government’s
hope for Moldova’s European future. In actual fact, Moldova had officially aired its
aspirations for membership for the first time during Lucinschi’s presidency in 1996,
and by 1999 it formally became the main strategic objective of Moldova’s foreign
policy (The European Strategy 2007). It has been further encouraged by the European
Parliament’s (EP) resolution on the Wider Neighbourhood Framework which clearly
recognised ‘the right of countries, such as Ukraine and Moldova, that explicitly
express their European aspirations to obtain EU membership when they fulfil all the
requisite political and economic criteria’ (European Parliament 2003, point 15). The
year 1999 also saw Moldova adopt the Concept of Integration in the EU, soon
transforming into the European Strategy in 2005,16 and the Declaration on the Political
Partnership to Achieve the Objective of European Integration signed by all parties of the
Moldovan parliament.17 These intentions were duly institutionalised through the
creation of a National Commission for European Integration headed by the prime
minister, and a new Department for Integration within the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. A further symbolic step in the direction of closer cooperation with the EU was
the opening of a Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Moldova in Brussels in
January 2005.
In 2005 Moldova signed the Action Plan (AP) under the new ENP agreement albeit
after taking several long rounds to negotiate its course.18 The AP considerably
politicised the need for further reform including cooperation in justice and home
affairs, as well as the settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict.19 Some commentators
noted that the AP, originally envisaged as partnership, reflected a considerable dose of
EU self-interest, and had a strong sense of ‘centre–periphery’ relations, being ‘quite
‘‘thin’’ on EU responsibilities’ (Popescu 2005, p. 38) and ‘more or less commanding’
(Buscaneanu 2006, p. 26).
Shortly after signing the AP, an EU Special Representative for Moldova was
appointed with a mandate that also included the monitoring of Moldovan–TMR
relations. Six months later the EU opened the European Commission Delegation to
Moldova and began talks on a settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict under a new
15For more discussion on this see Chiril (2001), Buscaneanu (2006, 2008a) and Gheorghiu (2005).
16The strategy, formally acknowledged by the European Commission, was requested by Presidential
Decree No. 351 (2/04/2004) but was never approved by parliament (Gheorghiu 2005). It actually
emerged before Moldova signed up to the ENP Action Plan (AP), and was indeed initiated on its own
accord, showing Moldova’s clear aspirations for European integration. After signing the AP, the
strategy’s structure was adjusted to reflect the AP’s objectives, and was meant to be periodically
updated to monitor the AP implementation progress.
17The statement canbe accessed on thewebsite of theEPdelegation to theEU–MoldovaParliamentary
Cooperation Committee at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/fd/
dmd20050524_08/dmd20050524_08en.pdf, accessed 15 July 2009.
18Moldova felt inspired by the EP’s resolution in 2003, but soon became disappointed by the EU
proposal under the ENP, which appeared to add nothing new to Moldova–EU relations. See
Buscaneanu (2006, p. 25).
19See The EU–Moldova ENP Action Plan, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_
plans/moldova_enp_ap_final_en.pdf, accessed 15 July 2009.
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‘Five-Plus-Two’ format.20 By December 2005 the EU Border Assistance Mission to
Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM) was finally launched. In May 2006 Moldova was
accepted as a member of the South East Europe Cooperation Process (SEECP), which
was seen by the Moldovan government as an additional (and later, as a principal)
stepping stone to European integration. When a decision was made in Brussels to
recommend extending the APs to its neighbours for another year, President Voronin
was quick to reassure the EU that Moldova would meet the deadline without
problems, hoping as a frontrunner to negotiate a new (and more binding) deal with
Europe the following year (Buscaneanu 2008b, p. 23). The Commission, however,
strongly recommended that Moldova accept the offered extension, pointing out that
further reforms were needed to achieve ‘independence of judiciary, freedom of media,
respect for human rights, anti-corruption fight, and attractive investment climate’
(Commission of European Communities 2008a, p. 4). An official visit to Chisinau by
Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for Foreign Relations and the
ENP, in February 2008, dispelled any doubts that a new contractual agreement would
be signed soon unless considerable progress was made in completing the AP by July
2009. The 2009 parliamentary elections and their aftermath subsequently led to a
political impasse since it did not produce a sufficient majority in the parliament to elect
a Head of State. This considerably disrupted the progress of the AP and revealed a
whole gamut of internal limitations in Moldova related to its pro-European stance.
Ferrero-Waldner visited Moldova once again on 26–27 November 2009 in an attempt
to reassure the country of the EU’s continuing support, and to reinvigorate Moldova’s
commitment to Europe, scheduling the launch of new negotiations for an Association
Agreement for January 2010.21 The success of the latter, however, is subject to
Moldova’s ability to comply with the EU’s rules and regulations arising from these
negotiations and may be difficult to achieve given the budgetary and political
constraints in the country.22
Institutional/regulatory boundaries
Following the adoption of the AP, a number of important institutional and regulatory
developments took place. Apart from institutionalising EU–Moldovan relations
20The ‘five’ comprised Moldova, Transdniestria, Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE. The two were the
EU and the USA as two additional international observers.
21For more information see Ferrero-Waldner’s speech in the Moldovan parliament, Speech/09/563,
27 November 2009, available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference¼SPEECH/
09/563&format¼HTML&aged¼0&language¼EN&guiLanguage¼en, accessed 12 February 2010.
22For more details see http://soderkoping.org.ua/page27744.html, accessed 14 June 2010. Several
critical steps to achieve more stability in the country have been made, including the release of a joint
statement by the EU–Moldova Cooperation Council (21 December 2009) outlining further
commitments and actions for both partners (see http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/
docs/pressdata/en/er/112025.pdf, accessed 12 February 2010); the launch of negotiations on an
Association Agreement (see http://www.delmda.ec.europa.eu/whatsnew/press_releases_en.shtml, ac-
cessed 12 February 2010); and recently, the EU’s decision to increase funding for EaP, and Moldova in
particular for 2011–2013 (see http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference¼IP/10/221&
format¼HTML&aged¼0&language¼EN&guiLanguage¼en, accessed 15 July 2010).
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through various government, parliamentarian and civil society fora,23 the following
developments also took place, some of which were Moldova’s own initiatives. In April
2007, the Common Visa Application Centre was opened in Chisinau, to simplify
procedures for issuing visas to Moldova’s citizens, and the enforcement of the Visa
Facilitation and Readmission Agreements was introduced from January 2008. From
March 2008, Moldova was included on the list of states benefiting from the
Autonomous Trade Preferences (ATP), which differs from the Generalised System of
Preferences (GSPþ) by providing for duty-free and quota-free access to EU markets
for all products originating in Moldova (except for specific agricultural products). In
June 2008 a Pilot Mobility Partnership with the EU was signed, aiming to enhance
legal migration opportunities for Moldovan citizens, and to consolidate capacities for
migration management and the fight against illegal migration and trafficking. Other
developments included twinning arrangements and short-term expert missions
through the Instrument of Technical Cooperation and Information Exchange of the
European Commission (TAIEX) and cooperation with the European Investment
Bank on several projects concerning infrastructure and support for sustainable
development, especially in the light of the global economic recession (Spruds et al.
2008, p. 8).24
Despite some limited criticism of EU actions in relation to specific needs and
policies,25 the overall level of technical and procedural cooperation in the direction of
mutual boundary-shifting between the EU and Moldova has been relatively high
(Commission of European Communities 2008a). The problems, however, have arisen
when translating Moldova’s new pro-European institutional and regulatory frame-
works into practice. As the Commission’s Progress Report on Moldova observes,
‘effective implementation of reforms remains a challenge’ (Commission of European
Communities 2008a, p. 2). This is particularly true in the areas of judicial reform,
fighting corruption, ensuring media freedom and improving the business and
investment climate (Buscaneanu 2008a, 2008b; Munteanu 2008; Minzarari 2008).
Moldova’s handling of the problems resulting from the 2009 parliamentary elections
has been particularly revealing, including the outbreak of violence and the authorities’
repressive measures to restore order and silence the opposition, in particular by
summoning NGOs to court and persecuting opposition leaders, and the PCRM’s
corrupt attempts to reinstate themselves in power in the aftermath. Following new
parliamentary elections on 29 July 2009, the PCRM were reinstated in power, albeit
with a much smaller 45% share of the vote and 48 seats, as the leading (but not the
majority) party in parliament. This in turn promised a further fierce fight for the
country’s leadership.26
23For more details see The European Strategy (2007, Section 1.1 especially).
24For a full evaluation of the EU–Moldova AP see Buscaneanu (2008a), European Commission
(2008a) and Minzarari (2008).
25In the first instance these include decision making towards visa fee facilitation policy and more
effective tools to fight economic recession. See Popescu and Wilson (2009) and Popescu (2005).
26For more information on election results and reports, see: http://www.alegeri.md/en/, ADEPT
branch site, accessed 15 July 2009. At the time of writing the power struggle continued between
different party factions in parliament to elect a new president. For details see Wilson (2009), and
‘Pereizbranniki naroda’, Kommersant, 99, 4154, 4 June 2009.
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Given the slow pace of real reform it has been suggested that the Moldovan
authorities have been playing a ‘small-step tactic’, obscured by elaborate legislative
acts and pro-European rhetoric, but in real terms they are aiming to secure the EU’s
financial backing to simply maintain the status quo: ‘Greater progress in ‘‘sensitive’’
sectors will be unlikely, as liberalisation of reforms in these fields will undermine the
ruling party’s hold on power. In Moldova, like elsewhere, power is a very valuable
asset’ (Buscaneanu 2008a, p. 87).
Transactional boundaries
During the period 1991–2006 Moldova received e320 million from the EU, mainly
through the TACIS and Macro Financial Assistance Instrument (MFAI) pro-
grammes. The National Indicative Programme for Moldova (2007–2010) envisioned a
budget of e209.7 million from the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument
(ENPI). This was to be further supplemented with funds from the governance facility
(for example e16.6 million in 2008), some ongoing projects financed by TACIS and
some compensatory schemes available under the MFAI. Furthermore, the European
Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) has also provided some
limited funding (for example e200,000 in 2007). Altogether this means that Moldova
has been one of the leading ENPI financial recipients, receiving a per capita spending
of e48.27 With the introduction of the EaP Moldova is likely to benefit further as
financial aid is likely to increase by another e2.1 billion by 2020 (Cristal 2009).
In 2007 and 2008 the ENPI Annual Action Programme (AAP) for Moldova
included e80 million to assist integrated border management and improvement of the
border control within the EUBAM, as well as reform of the social assistance system
and support for civil society in the TRM. Whether and how the latter translates into
practice is another matter, especially in light of inherent limitations of the ENPI
(Bosse 2009) and its restricted leverage in the TMR. Border management remains the
most successful and by far the most generously sponsored project. Apart from direct
funding from EUBAM, Moldova also received e400,000 worth of technical assistance
(such as printers, computers and telephones) and e730,000 for developing the Border
Guard Service. There was also funding of e1 million for cross-border cooperation
(CBC) projects to fight human trafficking and drug smuggling. Furthermore, Moldova
has received financial aid on an ad hoc basis. For example, in 2007 it was provided
with e3 million to combat the unprecedented drought; and a further e10 million was
allocated under the Food Security Programme. EIDHR provided an additional
e200,000 in aid for the Transdniestrian region, which however, is rather negligible
especially when compared with EIDHR spending in other parts of the world (Spruds
et al. 2008, p. 10), or indeed, in light of Russia’s 2009 launch of a $7.5 billion crisis
fund for neighbouring economic partners, of which TMR is one.28
27For comparison, ENPI per capita spending for other East European neighbours in 2008 was as
follows: e33 for Armenia; e26 for Georgia, e11 for Azerbaijan and Ukraine. Only the Palestinian
Authority receives more financial aid per capita (e152) than that of Moldova under the ENP. For more
information see Spruds et al. (2008, p. 7).
28‘Russian Lawmakers Approve $7.5bln Crisis Fund for Neighbouring Economic Partners’,
Associated Press, 15 July 2009.
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Interestingly, these generous financial provisions make Moldova the top aid
recipient per capita in the region, but do not automatically translate into Moldova’s
unequivocal commitment to the European course. As some scholars have commented:
Moldova’s ruling political elite has been rather ineffective in advancing the European
integration idea as the central consolidating national idea. [It] has been hesitant in adopting
new foreign and security policy strategies, which would unequivocally identify Moldova’s
European choice. It has also taken a reactive . . . stance vis-a`-vis Europe, [which] gives doubts
about the actual intentions of Moldova’s ruling elite. (Spruds et al. 2008, p. 13)
Many more tangible and regulated efforts would be needed to afford a real shift of
transactional boundaries in favour of closer cooperation between the EU and
Moldova, most of all in the areas of facilitation of a free visa regime, better regulated
workforce provisions for Moldovan citizens in the EU, and especially a more nuanced
governance of Romania’s policies towards Moldova.29 Above all, however, manage-
ment of the Transdniestrian conflict remains the most conspicuous hindrance to
effective EU–Moldovan cooperation.
Conflict management boundaries: the Transdniestrian conflict
The Transdniestrian conflict is one with more of a political than an ethnic nature
(Kolstø & Malgin 1998) and has been ongoing for over a decade, with limited progress
towards tangible solutions. EU involvement clearly intensified from 2005, thus
increasing Western pressure in the region. The great challenge however has concerned
how to decrease Russia’s influence in the region, which as the next section will
demonstrate, may be as difficult as removing geopolitics from Moldova’s existence
(Quo Vadis 2007; Vahl 2005; Minzarari 2009; Popescu 2006).
So far four major negotiations to resolve the conflict have taken place, with limited
progress towards settlement. The first was launched in July 1992 between Russia and
Moldova with a view to reaching a bilateral ceasefire agreement and to establishing a
tripartite peacekeeping force (comprising of Russia, Moldova and TMR). The
arrangements remained unsatisfactory, reflecting Russia’s geo-strategic interest in
the region. In May 1997, a Memorandum on the ‘Normalisation of Relations between
the Republic of Moldova and the Transnistrian Moldavian Republic’ was launched by
Evgeny Primakov, then the Russian Foreign Minister, and signed in Moscow. It
introduced the concept of a ‘common state’ in search of a federal solution to the
conflict, also providing for a gradual withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping troops from
the region. Further negotiations proved ineffective however, resulting in Moldova’s
withdrawal from the negotiations in 2001, and Russia extending its presence in TMR
indefinitely.
29This is particularly relevant in light of Romanian President Traian Basescu’s announcement on 14
April 2009 on facilitating the process of granting Romanian citizenship to Moldovans, which
potentially could cause exodus of the Moldovan population and severely undermine its economic
status quo. For more information see Dura and Gnedina (2009).
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A ‘Memorandum on the Basic Principles of the State Structures of the Unified
State’, known as the ‘Kozak Referendum’, was offered (again at Russia’s initiative) in
November 2003, pushing further for the creation of a federalised Moldova. The
document also mentioned the need to retain Russian military presence on Moldovan
territory for a period of 20 years. This clearly pro-Russian document was rejected by
President Voronin, albeit after a long period of consideration. Instead, in 2004,
Moldova (with the support of the EU and the USA) offered a ‘3-D strategy’—
Demilitarisation, Decriminalisation and Democratisation—which proposed a five-
party format for the conflict-settlement to now include Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, the
OSCE and TMR. From November 2005 the US and EU joined as observers. Western
presence was further enforced with the launch of the EUBAM mission in 2005.
In response Russia introduced sanction-driven policies against Moldova banning
the import of some agricultural produce and wine, and claiming the repayment of
energy debt (accompanied by shortages of gas supplies) during 2006–2007 (Popescu
2006; Minzarari 2009). In March 2009, however, on the eve of Moldova’s
parliamentary elections, a Kremlin-brokered meeting between President Voronin,
TMR President Smirnov and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev took place to
negotiate a new settlement deal for the region premised on Russia’s proposal of
transforming peacekeeping forces.30 However, apart from certain electoral gains
pursued by Voronin on the eve of the elections, the actual declaration had little new to
offer: ‘What this is about is not the improbable transformation of the current
peacekeeping mission [into an OSCE-supervised contingent], but about the lack of
future progress towards Russian withdrawal’ (Tomiuc 2009).
Thus, besides some declaratory statements by the Moldovan leadership, Russia’s
heavy steering of negotiations and the limited or disunited involvement of the EU,
management of the conflict with TMR has seen little progress and is unlikely to see
any for some time, as the next section highlights. Boundary shifting has so far proved
to be a long and problematic path for Moldova. On the one hand, Moldova unduly
exaggerated its expectations for EU membership, by suggesting a concrete deadline of
2007, while not being able to deliver its pledges. Declaratory politics, incomplete AP
and PCA, corrupt elections and political instability in 2009, conditioned by the power-
mongering of the Moldovan leadership made its allegiance to the EU ambiguous and
in practice, non-committal. Moldova has seemed to adopt European rhetoric only
when it suited, for electoral gains and power maintenance rather than for real reform
on the ground. On the other hand, the geo-strategic interplay of its larger
neighbours—Russia and the EU—also reflects Moldova’s failures and hesitation,
and is the subject of the next section.
Falling between stools: the geopolitical boundaries of EU governance
As with other East European states, Moldova finds itself in the contested
neighbourhood of both Russia and the EU, and naturally attempts to balance its
relations with both powers by playing geopolitics on their contradictions (Phinnemore
30This was the second meeting between the presidents of Moldova and TMR in the history of the
conflict. See Tomiuc (2009).
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2006, p. 7). The larger neighbours clearly pursue differing aims and tactics towards
Moldova, thus achieving various degrees of success and leverage over the country:
‘Whereas the EU pursues an under-resourced technocratic neighbourhood policy,
Russia pursues a well-resourced geopolitical policy that touches raw nerves
throughout the neighbourhood’ (Popescu & Wilson 2009, p. 2). The outcome of the
interplay however, is far from straightforward. Although Moldova has progressively
shown signs of greater involvement and commitment (at least on paper) to the EU,
Russia’s presence in the region remains far more tangible and in many ways, far more
substantial than it appears on the surface.
Russia’s imprint on Moldova’s policies is evident in the Moldovan leadership’s
rhetoric—ranging from sporadic statements of disappointment with Europe, subtle
criticism of EU politics and overt testimonies, such as Voronin’s claim that Moldova
‘must resist in the face of Europe just as Cuba resists in the face of the US’
(Phinnemore 2006, p. 9). Also, more tellingly, Moldova’s actions, especially in critical
situations of power challenge, have indicated its continuing dependence on Russia’s
power politics. Russia’s preponderance in the region is unquestionable. It deploys hard
power—from military, economic and nationalist to electoral and political tools—to
fully exert and extend its influence over the country. For example, Russian troops
remain actively stationed in the TMR and may be immediately deployed as necessary.
Russia is also a key player, and more importantly, is perceived as such by the
Moldovan elite, in the process of conflict resolution in Transdniestria, the success of
which came to be seen as almost entirely dependent on Russia’s political will (Popescu
2006, p. 5).31
Russia has also used various economic means to negotiate its political leverage,
such as the sudden reductions in the supply of gas, oil and electricity during the
winter of 2005–2006 after the failure to reach agreement on the Kozak
Memorandum for Transdniestria. As Popescu and Wilson point out, ‘the TMR’s
debt to Gazprom on the eve of the January 2009 gas crisis was bigger than
Ukraine’s ($1.8 billion as compared with $1.5 billion), but no one in Moscow
thought of putting pressure on the satellite’ (Popescu & Wilson 2009, p. 5).
Economic embargoes on Moldova’s main items of export—on wine and some
vegetables that allegedly contained pesticides, as well as on heavy metals and other
hazardous substances—were used to discipline Moldova for its increasingly defined
leaning towards the West. Conversely, industries in the TMR have considerably
benefited from Russia’s generous subsidies and investments, and Russia’s political
backing on the international level makes it harder for Moldova to negotiate a
suitable settlement of the conflict with the TMR.32
Russia’s policy on the issue of passports to residents of the TMR is another useful
tool in its promotion of ‘divide and rule’ politics. Its main objective is to secure
Russia’s legitimate right to intervene in order to protect the interests of Russian
citizens on territories with unsettled identities. Russia effectively applied this right to
31The views of the Moldovan elite, as revealed in elite interviews, are discussed in the next section.
32Research Paper on Transnistria by the Centre for Strategic Studies and Reforms, 2003, available at:
http://www.cisr-md.org/pdf/0311%20transn-research.pdf, accessed 15 July 2009.
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intervene in the TMR, which has no common border with Russia but where 15% of
residents are formally Russian-passport holders.33
This influence extends to the level of electoral politics, and Russia’s active political
engagement in domestic elections has been felt throughout the period since Moldova’s
independence. Notably, Russia’s preferred choice of candidates was successfully
pursued in 2001, resulting in the unexpected victory of the PCMR which secured just
over 50% of the vote. The outcome, not surprisingly, was Moldova’s adoption of
greater foreign policy flexibility towards the CIS, even raising the prospect of a joint
union with Belarus and Russia.34 In early 2003, similar goals were evident in attempts
to affect the PCRM’s vote share in local elections (49.9%35) and to put additional
pressure on the Moldova–EU ENP negotiations that year (Gorda 2003; Marandici
2008). In 2007 in the aftermath of the local elections which barely ‘secured’ the
PCRM’s victory (39.7% of vote share in 2007 elections36) Voronin yet again redefined
his allegiances in favour of Russia, two days before his meeting with Vladimir Putin in
Moscow (Minzarari 2008, 2009). The 2009 parliamentary elections were no exception
to the electoral game played by the regime in an attempt to attract Russia’s support.
Before his meeting with Medvedev, on the eve of the elections, Voronin, in his
interview to the Russian newspaper Kommersant, openly stated his displeasure with
the EaP by comparing it to the ‘EU-controlled CIS-II encirclement of Russia’, and
questioning its usefulness for Moldova.37 He subsequently received Russia’s full
backing regarding Moldova’s controversial elections: the Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Duma stated that they were ‘in full correspondence with democratic and
legal norms’ and openly accused some external actors of purposefully undermining the
‘socio-economic stability’ and ‘balanced foreign policy’ of Moldova (Dura & Gnedina
2009, p. 3). This clearly suggests, as aptly expressed by Minzarari, that ‘when cost-and-
benefits of the Russian pressure become significantly bigger than those from the EU,
Moldova . . . will choose the course of action that will benefit the most powerful’
(2009, p. 27).
In contrast, the EU, perhaps naively, has seen itself as an influential normative
player in the region, whose appeal is based on the broad notions of interdependency
and its political and economic attractiveness to the neighbours (Raik 2006; Youngs
2004). The EU, however, often takes its ‘soft power’ appeal for granted, as reforms
that the EU demands from its neighbours are hard, laborious and in the short term,
socially alienating. They require firm commitment from the partners and certain
political sacrifice to stay the course, which does not often find resonance with the
multi-vectored policies of the EU neighbours, heavily influenced by Russia. As
Popescu and Wilson observe, ‘pro-EU sentiments in the neighbourhood are broad but
shallow and confused. . . . Publics and governments tend to see a ‘‘European choice’’
as a geopolitical alignment, rather than a commitment to put their houses in order’
33Interestingly, statistics indicate that there are more Russian inhabitants in Chisinau, Moldova’s
capital, than in the whole of the TMR. See Munteanu (2008, p. 14).
34RFE/RL Newsline, 23 April 2001.
35See Central Election Commission, available at: http://www.parties.e-democracy.md/en/local
elections2003/, accessed 15 July 2009.
36See http://www.alegeri.md/en/2007/, accessed 21 June 2010.
37‘Pereizbranniki naroda’, Kommersant, 99, 4154, 4 June 2009.
1280 ELENA KOROSTELEVA
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 K
en
t] 
at 
02
:48
 14
 A
pr
il 2
01
4 
(2009, pp. 3–4). Moreover, the EU remains cautious and unambitious about what it is
willing to offer to its neighbours, and to Moldova in particular, effectively avoiding
any concrete discussions of the much wanted finality for EU–Moldovan cooperation
in the form of eventual EU membership. The EU’s inconclusive commitment in
relation to the future prospects for front-runners like Moldova and Ukraine is
understandable, but may be politically erroneous. Driven by its own enlargement
fatigue, concomitant with internal problems of legitimacy and recession, the EU has
lacked any distinct vision of the future for European integration, which is also to be
defined through its rapprochement with Russia in their treatment of ‘Europe-in-
between’. Although explicable, this (non-)commitment of the EU leaves Moldova with
the enormous problems of how to steer its European integration without any prospect
of integration, and how to resist a far more assertive Russia’s realpolitik. It seems
likely that more oscillation towards the East may be a likely outcome given the
ongoing economic crisis, Russia’s eagerness to help and the EaP’s limited appeal for
Moldova.
The Moldovan cultural boundary: ‘between two stools’, and will it fall to the ground?
This section explores the cultural boundary that, along with geopolitics, has the
potential to sway Moldova’s course in either direction and make boundary shifting for
the EU difficult, if not impossible. Primary survey research conducted in the region
suggests that pro-European discourse amongst the Moldovan population and its elite
seems sufficiently robust to withstand the uncertainties of the future. On the other
hand, as the results of a more nuanced examination of elite responses and focus groups
reveal, Moldova’s European choice is not yet set in stone and may considerably
decrease under the assertive pressure of Russia.
Population survey
Moldova clearly stands out from its eastern neighbours by showing unprecedented
levels of public enthusiasm and support for European integration. Our opinion survey
showed that support for joining the EU almost trebled from 32% in 1998 to 78.8% in
late 2008.38 Furthermore, Moldovans also seem to demonstrate good awareness and
knowledge about the EU in their self-perception.39 According to our survey, many
associate the EU with economic prosperity (57%), freedom of movement (38%),
democracy (32%) and stability (30%). Two-thirds of the population perceive the EU
as a benevolent and altruistic political player. An overwhelming majority (84%) state
that mutual trust forms the foundation for EU–Moldova relations. A total of 63% of
38These figures are corroborated by other surveys conducted in Moldova, showing a clear pro-
European trend of opinion amongst the general population. See, for example, ‘Report on the
Assessment of Public Perception Regarding the Process of European Integration and Implementation
of EU-RM Action Plan’, IDIS ‘Viitorul’, April 2008, and other relevant documents, available at:
http://docs.moldova.org/category/european-integration-10-eng.html, accessed 15 July 2009.
39For details please see a synopsis of our project findings, available at: http://www.aber.ac.uk/
interpol/en/research/EKPproject/index.htm.
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respondents note that ‘thinking about the EU’ arouses in them feelings of hope and
faith; and every tenth respondent feels enthusiasm and motivation towards the EU.
In contrast to their eastern neighbours, Moldovans see themselves as having much
in common with their fellow Europeans: they tend to ascribe many liberal values,
including democracy, human rights and respect for diversity, which they normally
associate with the EU, to their country as well, and they do not perceive themselves as
culturally different to the rest of Europe. Such positive attitudes to Europe—almost
exceptional in the East European region according to opinion polls40—may suggest
that Moldova is now irrevocably committed to European integration, thus shifting its
cultural boundaries unequivocally Westward. However the picture does not appear to
be so straightforward when it comes to choosing between the West and the East. In
this respect, the ‘competition’ between the EU and Russia is very close, with 40%
believing that ties with Europe are more important as opposed to 34% who think that
ties with Russia are more important. Furthermore, about 45% of the respondents
support the current government’s foreign policies which include Russia as Moldova’s
first priority. In response to a question asking how they would vote if there were ‘a
referendum tomorrow’, 39% of Moldovans said they would vote for strengthening ties
with both the EU and Russia, with a further 33% clearly prioritising the EU and 19%
Russia. In other words, the choice was not at all clear-cut, suggesting a subtle
difference between Moldovans’ alignment with Europe (which many of the neighbours
also seem to display) and their commitment to Europe, which is yet to emerge
(Popescu & Wilson 2009, p. 4).
Elite interviews
Further insights into this cultural and geopolitical differentiation are revealed by
individual-level responses from our elite interviews and focus groups. Expert interviews,
conducted as part of our project in early 2009 with Moldovan government officials,
journalists, representatives of think-tank organisations andmembers of the civil service,
indicated a rather pragmatic and almost promiscuous attitude of Moldovan elite
members to the country’s European policy. Almost all respondents unanimously
pointed out that despite the officially declared European direction ofMoldova’s foreign
policy, it was actually divided between Russia as its first priority and Europe as its
second priority, and that policy was pursued in detail in accordance with the country’s
immediate economic objectives. For example, according to one respondent:
. . . Moldova, whether she wants it or not, chooses her policies not because of some ‘shared
norms’ but according to her plain economic interests. If people wish to live by European
standards they may do so, but for Russia it does not make any difference . . . . (Think-tank
representative, Chisinau, December 2008)
From the elite perspective, the inclusion of Russia in Moldova’s main foreign policy
priorities is not accidental or contradictory. As many interviewees observed, pragmatic
40For more information see www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/ESRCInfoCentre/minisites/widereurope/
index.html, accessed 15 July 2009.
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prioritisation of Russia over their ‘moral’ commitment to Europe was simply a matter
of realpolitik, owing to Moldova’s excessive trade and energy dependency on Russia,
Russia’s leading role in the settlement of the Transdniestrian conflict, and the potential
security threat Russia posed for Moldova:
Russia plays a decisive role in solving the conflict . . . It is also our major energy exporter to
Moldova. (MP, Committee on Foreign Policy and European Integration, Chisinau,
December 2008)
Today’s Russia—being large and undemocratic—is a direct threat to any country in the
region. I am not saying that Russia as a country, but Russian government . . . . (MP,
Committee on Foreign Policy and European Integration, Chisinau, December 2008)
Russia is our major trading partner, and a key player in the Transdniestrian conflict . . . .
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of European Integration, Chisinau, December
2008)
This is not to say that the Moldovan elites, in contrast to their people, are
Eurosceptic, cynical or unenthusiastic about Moldova’s European course. In fact,
quite the opposite is the case, in that they all see their future in Europe and they
perceive Moldova’s Associational status as the next natural step forward. Equally,
they do not see any critical cultural differences or indeed historic traditions that could
divorce them from Europe. Contrary to the views of the general public however, they
remain more cautious about the precariousness of Moldova’s position as ‘Europe-in-
between’, which is duly reflected in its ambiguous foreign policy:
It is not the EU’s policy towards Moldova that is ambiguous or declaratory . . . It is our
politics that is unclear . . . What is certain, though, is that Moldova cannot implement all EU
requirements, not only because they are unattainable, but because of far more objective
reasons—we, as a country, has not yet committed ourselves to the EU . . . . (Social
Democratic Party, Parliament, Chisinau, December 2008)
Apart from the geopolitical boundary that still remains firmly in place, a far more
nuanced cultural boundary has surfaced, which the EU has yet to address—that is,
Moldova’s feeling of inferiority and absolute reliance on third-party directives. All
respondents explicitly noted that there cannot be a conceivable equal partnership
between the EU and Moldova, simply because the latter is too ‘insignificant’ and
‘needy’:
Of course we are not equal partners, and we should realise and accept this! We aspire to
become a younger brother, who should look up and obey the big brother’s orders. (Social-
Democratic Party, Chisinau, January 2009)
Yes, I believe, the EU must and can dictate its own conditions, simply because it is in our
interests: if we wish to integrate into the EU, we have to listen! (Committee on Foreign Policy,
Parliament, Chisinau, January 2009)
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This particular cultural attitude clearly raises a problem for the EU with regard to
the prospects for clear progress and a firmer commitment to European reforms in
Moldova. Conversely, and perhaps, far more importantly, this attitude is also
problematic for Moldova, which instead of taking the lead in foreseeing European
reforms, shifts responsibility for their initiation and implementation to third party
supervision. The ramifications of such passivity on the part of a partner-state may be
far reaching. First, it undermines the original idea of partnership (through
participation) and intellectual ownership upon which the ENP and the EaP are
conceptually premised, thus inadvertently limiting their potential impact; but secondly
and more crucially, this over-reliance on the directives and governing hand of the EU,
further enhanced by a domestic sense of inferiority, requires the EU’s constant custody
over Moldova and the offering of more tangible incentives which it cannot give or
promise. In contrast, as Medvedev’s actions have shown, Russia finds such styles
of guardianship agreeable and is ready to negotiate with Moldova on its own
conditions.
Focus groups
The findings of focus groups further challenge the picture of Moldova’s seemingly
uniform commitment to Europe, exposing more pronounced cultural differences and
geopolitical choices.41 In particular, an absolute majority of focus group participants
noted that Moldova’s European allegiances are on paper only and in practice they
have always followed the Russian course:
Moldova’s foreign policy has always been defined by the external political situation. We are a
small country and therefore ought to orient our objectives in accordance with policies of
larger states. (Experts, Chisinau, 5 June 2009)
Focus group respondents also proved more Eurosceptic and critical of the
EU’s treatment of Moldova, explicitly questioning its ulterior motives towards the
country:
I think Europe takes care of us as barbarians . . . They give us bread crusts so we keep quiet
and peaceful. Because if they leave us hungry, we can create trouble, and take their bread
away . . . This is the European wisdom. (Mixed group, Kahul, 12 June 2009)
Paradoxically, individual-level responses in focus groups also revealed more cultural
differences that were initially noted by the nationwide survey. In particular,
respondents highlighted the impact of Soviet legacies, historic traditions and indeed,
a different set of norms and values to those of the West, that now have been inculcated
41Five focus-groups were conducted in Moldova during May–June 2009, comprising of eight
participants sampled using a snowballing method and a screening questionnaire. Individual groups
consisted of: (i) students; (ii) women with higher education; (iii) men with higher education; (iv) people
working in think-tanks (academics, NGO and policy institute members) with some knowledge of the
ENP/EaP (experts); and (v) a control group of mixed origin.
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into people’s behaviour and mentality. One comment for example, was: ‘We differ
from them by our system of values, traditions, customs, which define us as a nation.
This includes our upbringing and is reflected in our way of thinking’ (mixed group).
Some also observed differences in Moldova’s predisposition to a more authoritarian
style of governance; others noted that people’s relations in the East were more open
and less calculating (as opposed to the West). Overall, however, the gap was not
regarded as insurmountable, and could be breached with sufficient motivation: ‘If we
speak about political culture, then, believe me, we are hundreds of years apart from
the EU; ethically, however, we are the frontrunners, and they can learn a lot from us’
(educated male, small town, central region).
To conclude, both elite interviews and focus groups spelt out more clearly the
precarious ambiguity and cultural peculiarity of Moldovan foreign policy. Belonging
to ‘Europe-in-between’, Moldova naturally resists a firm definition of its priorities,
often relying on ‘the hand that appears closer to its mouth’ at any given moment of
time. Additionally, Moldova’s cultural over-reliance on EU orders and directives may
be partly a response to its Soviet past, reflecting an inability to create adequate
foundations for building partnerships on equal and participatory terms. EU
governance, on the other hand, may be a useful tool in the short term, but is
unsuitable for cultivating lasting reciprocal relations for the future—that is, the kind
of relations that assume a two-way exchange.
School essays
The ideas expressed in the pupils’ essays stand out in their value, as they, to some
degree, project Moldova’s vision of the future, as seen through the eyes of its future
generation. Three particular sentiments are worth noting.
First, an attitude that may be summed up as ‘no shame, but blame’. Although
growing up in poverty and seeing their country being torn apart by corruption,
recession and war, the children did not seem to submit to feelings of inferiority or
meekness as was often the case with the surveyed adults. Instead, clearly perceiving
the tragedy of their situation, they directly attributed blame to the limitations of the
current government. For example, for one pupil Moldova suffered from an
‘absolutely incompetent government when everything is decided by shouting and
beating’.
Secondly, and unexpectedly, there was a widespread perception of Moldova as a
lonely and forsaken country, associated with an image of an orphan abandoned by his
parents:
Moldova is in my opinion, like an orphan who has been abandoned by his family and has no
sense of direction. He wants to do something positive, but in the end is left with his wish, but
no concrete actions, because he is not sure where to go and is not ready to take responsibility
for what he wants.
Thirdly, however, there is also a belief in a European future for Moldova. Although
the children’s perceptions of Moldova were relatively pessimistic and frustrated at
times, their vision of the future was far more positive and reassuring. All of them
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confessed a desire to see Moldova as part of the EU, which in their understanding,
would give them a better quality of life and pride of their homeland. For example one
pupil commented: ‘. . . Our people have always been slaves to other nations and
empires; maybe this time, with the EU membership, we will see some freedom’.
To conclude, the children’s essays understandably expressed a considerable degree
of grief, dissatisfaction and negativity; however, their outlook of the future was
paradoxically unambiguous and positive: Moldova will be independent and prosper-
ous one day, as an intrinsic part of the European Union.
Conclusion: falling between stools or learning to survive?
This article has examined EU–Moldova relations from the external governance
perspective. In particular, the analysis has detected relatively high levels of
engagement in the areas of legislative reforms, economic restructuring and border
management in the process of Moldova’s adapting to the EU acquis. In 2005 Moldova
formally declared its absolute commitment to a European course, and until 2009 EU–
Moldovan relations had been progressing well (at least on paper). The year 2009,
however, saw Voronin’s open criticism of EU policies, his bilateral talks with Russia
over TMR which excluded the EU, his conspicuous absence at the EaP launch and his
general mishandling of the parliamentary elections, which certainly marks the year as
a watershed in EU–Moldovan relations placing Moldova further away from the
prospect of European integration than ever before.
To understand this seemingly sudden change in Moldova’s rather zealous
alignment with Europe, one needs to go beyond conventional governance
framework(s). The extension of governance framework to encompass an under-
standing of the boundaries of both sides reveals the salience of geopolitics and
culture in EU–Moldovan relations. The analysis clearly shows that Moldova, being
part of the contested neighbourhood of the EU and Russia, has been trying to
balance between the two powers playing on their contradictions and availability.
Source: Association for Participatory Democracy (ADEPT), available at: http://www.e-democracy.md/
en/cartoons/0002/, accessed 15 July 2009.
FIGURE 1. MOLDOVA: BETWEEN EUROPE AND RUSSIA
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Research based on the nationwide survey, interviews and focus groups,
corroborated the assumptions that no matter how enthusiastic the population
and the elites may feel about Europe, when it comes to choosing between the two
larger neighbours, Moldova’s ‘moral’ alignment with the EU gives way to a more
pragmatic ‘allegiance’ to Russia.
Furthermore, analysis revealed the considerable cultural peculiarity of Moldova
in its over-reliance on the directive governance of the EU. Given its particular
sense of inferiority, Moldova struggles to undertake reforms independently, and
requires constant EU custody. If the relations were to progress further, it would
require more clarity and commitment from the EU in order to convert Moldova’s
current alignment into a resolute commitment to a European course. This however
may not be possible; which leaves Moldova in a precarious situation of falling
between two ‘stools’, as Figure 1 depicts, in search of a safer and surer ‘landing’ in
the future.
Aberystwyth University
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